Abstract: Terrorists are engaged in an online jihad, characterized by the use of the internet to fundraise, distribute messages and directives, recruit and proselytize. It is impossible to shut down the entire presence of terrorists on the internet; however, this article details a proposal which can have a marked impact on the presence of terrorists on the internet. Using existing statutes, it is possible to regionalize terrorist websites, limiting them to an extremely small number of countries from which they may receive internet services. Once the terrorist message is limited to a particular region, a modification of current laws can allow for a cyber embargo on jihadist websites and their supporters. These efforts coupled with diplomatic cooperation can further the effort to curb the impact of jihadist websites, while simultaneously increasing the ability of governments to monitor these websites and, when necessary, shut them down.In this article Gregory S. McNeal outlines his proposal using as an example the active and official website of Palestinian Islamic Jihad, a designated terrorist organization. In Part 1 he provides a brief overview of the status of Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and its brazen efforts to stay online despite government efforts. He outlines a three step process by which the PIJ web presence and others like it can be eliminated. Step one involves the use of the existing material support statute, step two involves the creation of a cyber-embargo by modifying existing statutes to create a non-criminal “material supporter” designation which will prevent U.S. companies from conducting business with designated material supporters. Step three involves diplomatic efforts to globalize the reach of the techniques detailed in step one and two. In this part he also explains the practical effect each step in my proposed process would have on the official website of PIJ.In Part 2, he details the threat posed by the cyber jihad. He explains how terrorists use the internet to recruit, train for attacks and coordinate those attacks. He describes the clear advantages terrorist organizations enjoy by using websites and explain the current state of affairs. This sets the stage for a discussion of the current statutory framework which has to date only enjoyed moderate success.In Part 3, he moves beyond the threat and detail the legal and policy implications of using existing statutes to eliminate the web presence of terrorist organizations. He also details the limitations of the current statute and prepare the reader for a discussion of how, with slight modifications, the existing statutory and policy framework can markedly diminish the advantages terrorist organizations enjoy through their web presence.In Part 4, he details the critical next step in countering the cyber jihad. He explains the advantages of creating a cyber embargo of companies who provide “material support” to terrorist organizations, but who for legal or policy reasons may be beyond the reach of the material support statute. The creation of a cyber-embargo rests upon a non-criminal “material supporter” designation which will prevent U.S. companies from conducting business with designated “material supporters.” In essence, this process involves the creation of virtual “persona non grata.” He also details the diplomatic efforts necessary to globalize the reach of this counter terrorism strategy. Through cooperation with foreign governments, loopholes in the jihadist web presence can be closed and terrorist organizations can be forced to a limited number of potential host countries.He concludes the article by discussing the implications of following my approach, and the new counterterrorism opportunities such tactics present.http://ssrn.com/abstract=1002210